Supplementary Appendix (NOT FOR PUBLICATION) A1 Additional proofs
Proof of Claim 1: If 2 = 1 , the statement is trivial, so assume 2 > 1 . Denote y i = y ( i ), m i = m ( i ) for i = 1; 2. By (6), we have l a ( 1 ; y 1 ) + m 1 l a ( 1 ; y 2 ) + m 2 ; l a ( 2 ; y 2 ) + m 2 l a ( 2 ; y 1 ) + m 1 :
These may be rewritten as m 2 m 1 l a ( 1 ; y 1 ) l a ( 1 ; y 2 ) ; m 2 m 1 l a ( 2 ; y 1 ) l a ( 2 ; y 2 ) :
Consequently, l a ( 2 ; y 1 ) l a ( 2 ; y 2 ) l a ( 1 ; y 1 ) l a ( 1 ; y 2 ) ;
Suppose that 2 > 1 , but y 2 < y 1 . Then l a ( 2 ; y 1 ) l a ( 2 ; y 2 ) = Z y 1 y 2 @l a ( 2 ; y) @y dy < Z y 1 y 2 @l a ( 1 ; y) @y dy = l a ( 1 ; y 1 ) l a ( 1 ; y 2 ) ;
where the inequality follows from the assumption that y 2 < y 1 and the single-crossing condition: Proof of Claim 2: Suppose fy ; m g 2 minimizes L p (8) subject to (9)-(11), and inf 2 m ( ) = " > 0. Consider m 0 such that 8 2 : m 0 ( ) = m ( ) ". Then fy ; m 0 g 2 satis…es (9)-(11), has L p (y ( ) ; m 0 ( )) = L p (y ( ) ; m ( )), and has inf 2 m 0 ( ) = 0.
Proof of Claim 3: By (10), we have
Similarly,
which imply claim (i).
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To establish claims (ii) and (iii), note that from (10) we have, for any ",
= L a ( 0 + ") + l a ( 0 ; y ( 0 + ")) l a ( 0 + "; y ( 0 + ")) ;
and similarly Hence, l a ( 0 + "; y ( 0 + ")) l a ( 0 ; y ( 0 + ")) "
Both the left-hand side and the right-hand side have the same limit
We can prove the formula for the left derivative similarly. Since
Since y ( ) is monotonic, this is equivalent to continuity of y ( ) at 0 , so the result on continuity follows.
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A2 Example with overshooting in the optimal contract
Under the regularity conditions in Parts 2 and 3 of Theorem 6, the optimal contract has the intuitive feature that the implemented action is always between the ideal points of the principal and the agent. Moreover, both the action scheme and the amount of money burning are continuous and weakly increasing functions of the state. Below we show that if the regularity conditions do not hold, the optimal contract might not have any of the above features (besides the implemented action being weakly increasing in the state, which is a general property by Claim 1). Moreover, we show that the violations of these properties are interrelated.
The next theorem establishes that if the optimal contract involves no overshooting (that is, if the implemented policy is always between the players'ideal points) then both the implemented action and money burning are continuous and increasing in the state.
Theorem A1 Assume that (y ( ) ; m ( )) is an optimal contract, and y ( ) + b( ) for every 2 (0; 1). Then both y ( ) and m ( ) are continuous and weakly increasing on (0; 1).
We prove the above result by showing that the type of deviation considered in the proof of Part 2 of Theorem 6, that is making the jump more gradual by o¤ering an in-between option to types around the jump point, increases the expected utility of the principal for arbitrary convex loss functions, as long as the jump is in between the ideal points of the players.
Proof of Theorem A1: Note that the requirement that
for every 2 (0; 1) and inf 2( 0 ;1] y ( ) y 2 > y 0 > y 1 holds whenever:
is decreasing in y for inf 2( 0 ;1] y ( ) y >ŷ 1 , for every 0 2 (0; 1) andŷ 1 0 . If y ( ) + b( ) for every 2 (0; 1), then inf 2( 0 ;1] y ( ) + b( ) for every 2 (0; 1). Then for every inf 2( 0 ;1] y ( ) y >ŷ 1 , the numerator of (A3) is decreasing in y, while the denominator of (A3) is increasing in y, implying that (A3) is decreasing in y. The same arguments used in the proof of Part 2 of Theorem 6 then imply the above result.
Next, we construct an example in which the optimal contract indeed involves overshooting and discontinuities, as well as non-monotonicity of money burning. We also provide an intuitive explanation why overshooting is optimal for the principal.
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To start with, consider a speci…cation of the model in which the loss functions are of the form: l p ( ; y( )) = 2(y( ) ) 2 , and l a ( ; y( )) = (y( ) 0:05) 2 . This is a special case of the class of loss functions considered in Section 5, with A = 2 and b = 0:05. Moreover, temporarily assume that f ( ) = . This contract speci…es overshooting at = 0:404 04, in order to bring the level of money burning back to 0. It is easy to verify that the utility that the above contract yields to the principal is bounded away from any contract that does not specify overshooting at any point of (which would imply that the amount of money burning is monotonically increasing). Modify now the above example such that f ( ) = 3 2 2" for 2 [0;
). For small enough " > 0 the above contract (which is still incentive-compatible, since the latter does not depend on the prior distribution) continues to yield a strictly higher payo¤ to the principal than any contract that does not specify overshooting. This establishes that the optimal contract requires overshooting (and hence a non-monotonic money burning scheme) in the modi…ed example, too. It can also be shown that in this example the optimal contract requires a discontinuity at some state in ( The intuition behind the optimal contract involving overshooting is the following: if the implemented action is kept between the optimal points of the principal and the agent, the A-4 amount of prescribed money burning is increasing, and if the implemented action is kept strictly below the agent's ideal point the money burning is strictly increasing. The only way the principal can decrease money burning at some state in an incentive compatible way is if he prescribes an overshooting action. In the above example, this becomes optimal in the region ( 1 3 ; 2 3 ), where the density of the prior is low. The optimal policy involves increasing money burning in low states, then overshooting in the region of unlikely states, and …nally increasing money burning again in high states. Intuitively, the principal sacri…ces utility in the unlikely states, in order to better align incentives in the more likely states and at the same time do not accumulate too high levels of money burning.
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A3 Results for the Case with Contingent Transfers
We start by establishing properties of the optimal contract that are analogous to properties obtained in the case without transfers.
Claim A2 There exists a solution to problem (18) subject to constraints (19)-(21). Moreover, under the conditions stated in Theorem 6, for any optimal contract (y ( ) ; m ( ) ; t ( )) the following hold:
(i) y ( ) is weakly increasing on [0; 1] and continuous on (0; 1);
Proof of Claim A2. The proofs of these results follow closely similar proofs for the case without conditional transfers, and are omitted.
The next result states that there is essentially no state at which there is both money burning and nonzero conditional transfer. An optimal contract speci…es conditional transfers in low states (if there is a region with nonzero transfers). These transfers are decreasing in the state and at some point reach 0. At the right of this point an optimal contract might specify money burning, such that money burning is increasing in the state in this region.
Claim A3 Suppose that the conditions stated in Theorem 6 hold. Then any two solutions to problem (18) subject to constraints (19)-(21) specify the same (y ( ) ; m ( ) ; t ( )) at almost every (i) Either m ( ) = 0 or t ( ) = 0, for every 2 . Moreover, m ( ) is non-decreasing in and t ( ) is non-increasing in ; in particular, m (0) = 0.
(ii) Either there exists 0 2 such that m ( 0 ) = 0 and t ( 0 ) = 0, or t ( ) > 0 for all .
Proof of Claim A3. (i) Suppose that m ( ) > 0 and t ( ) > 0 for a positive measure of .
Then there exists " > 0 such that the measure of the set f : m ( ) > "; t ( ) > "g is positive.
For all such 's, let m 0 ( ) = m ( ) " and t 0 ( ) = t ( ) "; in other cases, let m 0 ( ) = m ( ) and t 0 ( ) = t ( ). Then the contract (y ( ) ; m 0 ( ) ; t 0 ( )) would satisfy all constraints and yield a higher payo¤ to the principal than (y ( ) ; m ( ) ; t ( )), which is impossible. This contradiction proves that either m ( ) = 0 or t ( ) = 0 for almost all . Now, from Claim A2 we get that function m ( ) t ( ) is nondecreasing, and may without loss of generality assumed to be continuous. Therefore, we must have t ( ) = 0 whenever m ( ) t ( ) > 0 and m ( ) = 0 whenever m ( ) t ( ) < 0. Consequently, m ( ) = max fm ( ) t ( ) ; 0g and is therefore nondecreasing, while t ( ) = max ft ( ) m ( ) ; 0g is nonincreasing.
(ii) Without loss of generality, we may restrict attention to contracts with m (0) = 0. If this
were not the case, we could take m 0 ( ) = m ( ) m (0) 0 since m ( ) is nondecreasing, and we would get a contract (y ( ) ; m 0 ( ) ; t ( )) which would satisfy all constraints and have m 0 (0) = 0.
Given that, consider function t ( ). If t ( ) = 0 for some, then consider the supremum 0 of such points. By continuity of t ( ) and m ( ), we must have that t ( 0 ) = m ( 0 ) = 0. This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 11. Existence follows from Balder (1996) , similarly to Theorem 6.
Uniqueness follows from that the objective function is strictly convex in y ( ), and the constraints are also convex (this may not immediately obvious for (25), but notice that local IC constraints in the are linear in y ( ) and are su¢ cient for global IC constraints to hold; consequently, if (25) holds for some y 1 ( ) and y 2 ( ), then it also holds for any linear combination). Once the optimal y ( ) is determined uniquely, m ( ) t ( ) is also determined uniquely up to an additive constant, and then Lemma A3 implies that m ( ) = max (m ( ) t ( ) ; 0) and t ( ) = max (t ( ) m ( ) ; 0), and thus the additive constant is also uniquely determined from the condition that either (24) or (26) must bind at the optimum. These considerations imply uniqueness.
Notice that the problem (23) s.t. 
t. (28)-(29),
A-7 then we can de…ne m ( ) = 0 for 0 , t ( ) = t 0 for 0 , and the values of m ( ) for > 0 and t ( ) for < 0 are de…ned so as to satisfy part (iv) of Claim A2; in that case, (y ( ) ; m ( ) ; t ( )) will satisfy (24)- (26) and the values of the two minimands will again be the same. Consequently, it su¢ ces to solve the problem (27) s.t. We use Luenberger's Theorem in the following way. We take the Lagrange multiplier = 1.
We then take y ( ) = b A+1 + , 0 = 1, and t 0 =ũ Ab 1+A Ab (A+1) 2 . We need to establish that this combination of y ( ), 0 , and t 0 minimizes the following Lagrangian:
Substituting = 1, simplifying and eliminating the constant, we need to prove that it minimizes
!
For a given y ( ) 2 F, this expression is nondecreasing in 0 ; indeed, if y ( ) is di¤erentiable at 0 , then the derivative of this expression equals 2 (y ( 0 )
0 + b and y ( ) is nondecreasing), and if it is not di¤erentiable, then a similar bound is true for the lower right-hand derivative, which is also nonnegative. Thus, if for some y ( ), 0 , and t 0 the Lagrangian is smaller than under y ( ) ; 0 ; t 0 , then it is also the case for 0 = 1. But if 0 = 1, the expression becomes
which is minimized if y ( ) = b A+1 + , because this y ( ) minimizes the function under the integral for every . This means that the Lagrangian is indeed minimized at y ( ) ; 0 ; t 0 (as it does not explicitly depend on t 0 ).
It is straightforward to check that (28) is satis…ed as equality. Luenberger's theorem now implies that y ( ) ; 0 ; t 0 solve (27) s.t. (28). It remains to check that (29) is satis…ed, but this is equivalent tow ũ + Ab 
Then we take y ( ) and 0 as de…ned in the corresponding case of the respective characterization below, and let t 0 =w. It is then straightforward to verify that both (28) and (29) hold as equality. It is less straightforward to verify, but nevertheless is true that this combination of y ( ) and 0 minimizes the Lagrangian (A4) (and t 0 cancels out). To see this, the following auxiliary results (which are analogous to Lemma 1 and may be proved similarly) are of help:
If (y ( ) ; 0 ; t 0 ) solves (A4), then for satisfying y (0) < y ( ) < y ( 0 ), it must be that y ( ) = min fz ( ) ; + bg, where z ( ) = 1 1 A (1 ), and for satisfying y ( 0 ) < y ( ) < y (1), it must be that y ( ) = min fx ( ) ; + bg, where
The problem then reduces to optimizing over 0 and possible values of y ( 0 ); the corresponding calculations are extremely tedious and are available upon request.
Given the above, Luenberger's theorem implies that y ( ), 0 , and t 0 =w are indeed solutions to (27) s.t. (28) and (29).
Part 3. Suppose thatw ũ > b + b 2 . This case is similar to the corresponding case of Theorem 7. Notice that the value of (27) cannot be smaller thanw, as t 0 w, and
as follows from integrating the second term of the integral by parts. This value is achieved for 0 = 0, t 0 =w, and y ( ) = for all . This automatically satis…es (29), and, moreover, the left-hand side of (28) is
so (28) is also satis…ed. Thus, this contract is indeed optimal.
Proof of Theorem 11. Analogously to Theorem 8, the proof follows from the explicit characterization given in Theorem 11 and is omitted.
Proof of Theorem 13. Analogously to Theorem 10, the proof follows from the explicit characterization given in Theorem 11 and is omitted.
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A4 Explicit Characterization of Optimal Contract with Contingent Transfers
Here, we provide the explicit characterization of the optimal solution of problem (27) In addition, de…ne the following functions of A and b (informally, these correspond to values of the Lagrange multiplier , wherever applicable).
A-10 Finally, de…ne the following expressions:
Case 1: "Social optimum"
Ifw ũ < f 1 (A; b), then:
The values 0 = 1, t 0 =ũ Ab
2 . In this case, there is no money burning m ( ) = 0 for all ; transfer t ( ) >w in all states, with smallest amount t (1) = t 0 =ũ Ab 
where q = (A + )
where is the unique solution to
where is such that 3 (A; b) < 1 (A; b) . The values 0 = q (or any number on [q; 1]), t 0 = 0.
Furthermore, in all these cases there is no money burning: m ( ) = 0; there is minimal transfer t ( ) =w for q, and there is higher than minimal transfer t ( ) >w for < q.
Case 3: "Transfer for low actions, then some actions with no transfer, then a cap" If b < 1, A < 1 b and f 2 (A; b) w ũ < f 4 (A; b), then:
where is such that 9 (A; b) < 2 (A; b). If b 1, A < 
where is the unique solution to , where is the unique solution to
